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Résumé
Nous étudions les interactions entre les changements de législations sur le divorce,
l’évolution des taux de divorce et l’évolution de la tolérance à l’encontre du divorce.
On considère que les individus diffèrent dans la perte subjective qu’ils subissent en
cas de divorce. Cette perte étant elle-même associée à la stigmatisation du divorce.
La proportion de chaque type d’individus évolue de façon endogène au travers d’un
processus de transmission des préférences. La législation sur le divorce est déterminée
via un vote à la majorité qui porte sur deux alternatives : le divorce par consentement
mutuel et le divorce unilatéral. Dans le modèle, l’évolution du taux de divorce et le
changement de législation sont liés à la dynamique de transmission culturelle dans
la société. En particulier, l’accroissement du taux de divorce précède le changement
législatif. Ce dernier n’a qu’un effet accélérateur sur l’évolution du taux de divorce
et ne constitue pas le moteur de cette évolution comme les données semblent le
montrer.
Mots-clés : Mariage et Divorce ; Législation sur le divorce ; Evolution culturelle ;
Normes sociales
JEL Classification : J12, K10, Z10
Abstract
This article focuses on the three way relationship between change in divorce
law, evolution of divorce rate and evolution of the cultural acceptance of divorce.
We consider a heterogeneous population in which individuals differ in terms of the
subjective loss they suffer when divorced, this loss being associated with stigmatiz-
ing social norms. The proportion of each type of individual evolves endogenously
through a cultural transmission process. Divorce law is chosen by majority voting
between two alternatives: mutual consent and unilateral divorce. In this framework,
evolutions of divorce rate and divorce law may be jointly affected by the cultural
dynamics within the society. In particular, we are able to reproduce the fact that
divorce rate often raises before a legislation change. Indeed, the shift from consen-
sual to unilateral divorce has an accelerating effect on the increase in divorce rate
but is not the driving force behind this evolution.
Keywords: Marriage and divorce; Divorce legislation; Cultural evolution; Social
norms
JEL Classification: J12, K10, Z10
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1 Introduction
During the last decades, in OECD countries have occurred simultaneously a strong in-
crease in the divorce rate and important changes in divorce legislation. While some coun-
tries have authorized divorce which was until this time banned, others have introduced
"no-fault" divorce which can have taken different forms such as mutual consent divorce or
unilateral divorce. A number of studies have examined changes in divorce rates that might
be associated with a change in law for divorce grounds. There is no consensus regarding
the effects of these institutional changes on the rate of divorce. While some argue that
these changes by making easier to divorce contribute to a rise in divorce (Stevenson and
Wolfers, 2006; Gonzalez and Viitanen, 2009), others point out that these changes have
only a transitional effect on the divorce rate evolution and that this rise goes before the
introduction of new divorce laws (see Sardon, 1996; Allen, 1998 or Coelho and Garoupa,
2006 on respectively, the French, the Canadian and the Portugese cases). Some authors
suggest that the recent increase in divorce rate may be related to the decrease in the spe-
cific investment in marriage (Stevenson, 2007). The lower specialization of spouses within
household may be explained by the decrease in the price of household appliances that
reduces domestic time and thus decreases the benefit from staying married (Greenwood
and Guner, 2009). On the other hand, other studies point out the role played by changes
in the attitudes towards divorce within the society (Fella et al., 2004; Kalmijn, 2009).
In line with this last set of studies, we suggest that both divorce rate and divorce
law may be jointly affected by a third variable: the cultural acceptance of divorce within
the society. Moreover, we consider that this cultural factor is itself endogenous since its
evolution depends on the legislative and social environment. In other words, the presented
model focuses on the three-way interaction between changes in divorce laws, in divorce
rate and social norms. By social norms we mean the feeling that suffers some individuals
from being divorced. This feeling maybe linked to the degree of tolerance towards divorce
within society. This paper presents the advantage to provide a flexible framework which
could take into account the evolution of behaviors regarding divorce from an institutional
point of view as well as the household viewpoint.
We develop a model of divorce, socialization and divorce laws which are endogenously
determined. In the population there are two kinds of preferences distributed regardless of
gender. Some agents hold the social norm and suffer from a disutility from being divorced
while others disregard the stigma against divorce. According to their preferences agents
will vote for a divorce legislation among two alternatives: mutual consent divorce and
unilateral divorce. The model shows that those who suffers from the stigma always prefer
the former legislation while the others choose the latter one. Once they have voted, each
adult male is matched with an adult female to form a household and have two children.
Parents’ preferences are then transmitted through a cultural evolution process, in which
both parental preferences and parental divorce decisions matter. The match quality for
each spouse is revealed ex post and those with poor matches may divorce. In the model,
remarriage is ruled out following divorce.
A huge literature has been developed around the idea of transmission of preferences
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using the model introduced by Bisin and Verdier in 1998. This transmission of preferences
has been used to explain gender wage gap (Escriche, 2007) or transmission of attitudes
towards working mothers (Fernandez et al., 2004). In the current paper we introduce the
idea that the cultural trait transmitted by parents concerns the perception of the social
norms. Moreover, we consider that offsprings’ attitudes toward divorce are shaped by the
joint influence of parents own attitudes and parents divorce decisions. This joint effect is
highlighted by several sociological studies (see, for instance, Axinn and Thornton, 1996
or Kapinus, 2004). At an aggregate level, this cultural transmission process generates the
dynamical evolution of divorce rate.
In the model, the evolution of divorce rate is impulsed by changes in the composition
of the population. An increase in the proportion of individuals who disregard the stigma
from social norms will rise divorce rate. Moreover, when those individuals are in majority
within the society, divorce law changes reinforcing the pre-existing trend. So, according
to our analysis, a change in divorce law has an accelerating effect on the evolution of
divorce rate but is not the driving force behind the latter evolution. This result complies
with some of the empirical literature presented at the beginning of this introduction.
Notice that, the dynamics of preferences is endogenous and may be affected by economic
factors. In particular, the tightening of the utility gap between being married or divorced
implies an increase in the long-run proportion of agents who do not mind about the norm.
This tightening may come from an improvement in the price of household appliances that
reduces the specialization gains within household and thus the gains from being married.
On the other hand, changes in social stigma against divorce may also affect the dynamics
of preferences.
In this paper, we also test the relationship between changes in divorce law and divorce
rate. To do so, we estimate the probability of divorce reform on the divorce rate and the
share of birth out of wedlock. As divorce rate is endogenously determined by shifts in
divorce legislation we instrumented this variable. The two instruments used, the share
of women within population and the marriage rate lagged 3 periods, appear as strong
instruments and have a positive effect on divorce rate. Results seem to show that dy-
namics of divorce rates affects reform in divorce laws as in the estimation the divorce rate
influences positively the probability of divorce reform. We also try to introduce social
norms through the share of birth out of wedlock but results are mixed concerning its
effects on divorce reform. On the other hand, its effect on divorce rate matches what we
expect. The higher is the share of birth out of wedlock and so the acceptance of divorce,
the higher is the divorce rate.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the model, then we study the
dynamics and develop a static comparative analysis. In the last section, we develop an
empirical analysis in which we test the link between changes in divorce laws and divorce
rate.
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2 The model
The model focuses on the three-way interaction between changes in divorce laws, in di-
vorce rate and in the degree of tolerance towards divorce, in other words social attitudes
regarding divorce.
2.1 Framework
In each period there are two stationary, equally sized populations of adult, males and
females. Within these populations, two cultural traits co-exist {a, b}. This heterogeneity
captures differences in sensitivity to social penalties that individuals experiment when
they divorce. The idea is that the effect of norms against divorce is not the same for all
individuals within a society. While social attitudes towards divorce will be sanctioned
regardless of who violate them, people who care more strongly in the norms will feel
themselves more stigmatized if they violate them. For instance, among divorced persons
the religious one may face more disapproval from their social contacts than the secular
one (Kalmijn, 2009). Formally, we assume that when they divorce type b individuals
suffer from the social norms regarding divorce while type a disregard the stigma against
divorce.
Agents live three periods (one period of childhood and two periods of adulthood).
During the first period, children acquire their preferences. At the beginning of the second
period, young adults vote for a legislation about divorce. Then each young adult male is
matched with a young adult female to form a household. We assume that each household
has two children, a boy and a girl, such that the whole population is stationary. At the
end of the second period of life, the spouses are faced with the alternative choices of
whether to continue together or separate. The match quality for each spouse is revealed
ex post and those with poor matches may divorce. In the model, remarriage is ruled
out following divorce. Finally, young adults may socialize their children and the type of
children depends on the marital state of parents at the end of childhood.
Decisions
State
Socialization
Children
t=1 t=2 t=3
Vote
Matching revealed
Divorce
Married/DivorcedMarried
θ revealed
Two children
Children socialization
Figure 1: Timing of decisions
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2.2 Preferences
Let us consider that preferences are distributed regardless of gender. We denote by qt
the proportion of type a individuals within the population. This proportion is the same
within the male and the female population.
The utility derived by one individual depends on three components, his/her prefer-
ences, his/her marital status (married or divorced) and the match quality when married.
Let us define um(i, θ) the utility of a married individual of type i within a match charac-
terized by a quality θ. We assume that θ is an independent draw from a given symmetric
distribution with support R and zero mean. Any two married individuals who live in the
same household share the same value of um and θ, so there exist no gender differences in
preferences. This utility is given by:
um(b, θ) = um(a, θ) = um + θ (1)
with um a given parameter that measures the intrinsic utility from being in couple rather
than single. By (1) the utility derived from marriage is the same for the two types of
agent.
Conversely, the utility when divorced depends on preferences. The individual belief,
for example religion, affects how people feel about divorce. In particular, we assume that
b type individuals suffer an additional disutility s > 0 when they are divorced. This
parameter captures the fact that they consider themselves as stigmatized when they are
divorced. In other words, they suffer from social penalties towards divorce. We denote
by ud(i) the utility of a divorced individual with preferences i:
ud(a) = ud (2)
and
ud(b) = ud − s (3)
where ud measures the utility of a divorced individual.
The crucial, but quite standard, assumption is that individuals do not know the value
of θ when they are matched (Chiappori and Weiss, 2007; Chiappori et al., 2008). The
quality of the match is discovered only during the first period of match and according
to this realization they decide to remain married or to divorce. Negative surprises about
the match quality trigger divorce. In particular, an individual i prefers to divorce when
um(i, θ) < ud. It directly comes from (1)-(3) that an individual a prefers to divorce when:
θ < ud − um ≡ θa (4)
and an individual b wishes to divorce when:
θ < ud − um − s ≡ θb (5)
Then the threshold θi captures the critical value of the match quality under which an
individual i prefers to divorce. We can see that b type individuals are more prone to stay
6
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married for lower value of match quality due to the sigma of divorce that they suffer in
case of divorce.
We consider that all individuals have always incentives to enter in the marriage market
at the beginning of their second period of life. In other words, the expected utility of
marriage over the life cycle is higher than the utility of being single for the two adulthood
periods. Notice that utility of being single on the first period of adult life is not necessary
the same as the one extracted from being divorced in the second period of adult life.
This comes from the fact that individuals get a positive utility from having children that
subsists even if they are divorced.
2.3 Matching
We assume that each agent finds a match with probability one. All matches end up in
marriage because the expected gains from marriage are positive for each type of individual.
The matching between men and women is not fully random. We consider that individuals
with same preferences are more likely to be matched together. The matching process is
then biased towards homogamy. We can analyzed this matching process as Bisin and
Verdier (2000) did, by saying that there are two restricted marriage pools (one for each
type of individual) where people having the same cultural trait can possibly married
together. First, with a probability pi ∈ (0, 1) an individual of type i enters in the first
restricted pool and is matched with an individual i, so he/she will be in a homogamous
marriage. Second, with a probability 1 − pi agent enters in the second marriage pool in
which the matches are random. This process is illustrated in Figure 2:
a
a
aa
b
b
b
b
1− pi 1− pi
pi
pi
1− qt 1− qt
qt
qt
Figure 2: Matching process
It is well documented that marriages are assortative in several dimensions (Mare, 1991)
and the matching of individuals is strongly influenced by the social sphere in which they
are living. Individuals are more likely to meet someone belonging to their band of friends
or to the community in which they are living. For example, religious persons may be more
likely to meet someone going to the same church. Moreover, as individuals tend to be
regrouped with persons similar to them and tend to be married with someone belonging
to their community, thus they are more likely to be married with someone like them. The
first part of this matching process conforms with these evidence. However, it remains a
random part in matching process due to the meeting by chance of new persons that is
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taken into account through the second part of the presented matching process.1
We denote piijt the probability for an individual i to be matched with an individual j.
It follows from the matching process described above, that:
piaat = pi + (1− pi)qt (6)
piabt = (1− pi)(1− qt) (7)
pibat = (1− pi)qt (8)
pibbt = pi + (1− pi)(1− qt) (9)
There are four possible couples configurations: {a, b}, {b, a}, {a, a} and {b, b}. For
ease of presentation, let us refer to h type family to define heterogamous couples ({a, b}
or {b, a} matches), a type family for homogamous couples of type a ({a, a} matches), and
b type family for homogamous couples of type b ({b, b} matches).
2.4 Legislation and divorce probabilities
Before that the matching process takes place, young adults have to choose between two
archetypal divorce laws l: the mutual consent divorce (indexed by c) and the unilateral
divorce (indexed by u). In the vast literature studying effects of divorce laws on divorce
decisions (Gonzales and Viitanen, 2009; Fella et al., 2004) we find that under mutual
consent, a divorce occurs if the spouse who wants to divorce, compensates the one who
wants to stay married. And under unilateral divorce, a divorce will take place unless the
one who wants to stay married compensates the one who wishes to leave.
In the current paper we consider that, under consensual divorce c, the divorce occurs
if the two spouses prefer to divorce, while under unilateral divorce u, the couple divorces
if one of the two spouses want to divorce. Let us define the threshold θl(i, j) as the critical
value on the quality of the match under which a couple {i, j} divorces when the legislation
implemented is l ∈ {c, u}. Following the description of the two legislations, we obtain:
θc(i, j) = min{θi, θj} (10)
and
θu(i, j) = max{θi, θj} (11)
1. In this model, there is no effort concerning the matching process. We could have introduced an
endogenous choice of matching effort as Bisin and Verdier (2000) did. They based this assumption on
the idea that parents in their desire to transmit religious and social values wish to be in a homogamous
marriage. For example, families belonging to the "Bottin mondain" reject any "light customs" such as
divorce or cohabitation. Following this idea they will reject to be married with someone who does not
belong to the same social network in a sense with someone who does not hold the same preferences
towards divorce and marriage (Arrondel and Grange, 1993).
8
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Note that, we could consider that, under consensual divorce, the threshold θc(i, j) corre-
sponds to the mean between θi and θj, without qualitative consequences on our results.2
Divorce laws affect the spousal decision of divorce. From (4) and (5), we deduce:
θc(a, b) = θc(b, b) = θu(b, b) = θb (12)
and
θu(a, b) = θu(a, a) = θc(a, a) = θa (13)
The threshold θb (respectively θa) is the critical value of the match quality within a couple
in which an individual of type b (resp. a) has the final decision about divorce. It is the
case within homogamous b couples (resp. homogamous a couples). Moreover, there are
a range of value of θ (the [θb, θa] interval) for which only individuals of type a are prone
to divorce. Consequently, within heterogamous couples, individuals of type b (resp. type
a) have the final say if the divorce decision is consensual (resp. unilateral). Finally, since
the utility associated to divorce is lower for b type individuals than for a type ones, we
obtain: θa > θb.
Let us denote p(f, l) the expected divorce probability for a family f ∈ {h, a, b} when
the legislation is l. It directly comes from expressions (12) and (13) that:
p(h, u) = p(a, u) = p(a, c) = Prob(θ < θa) ≡ p¯ (14)
p(h, c) = p(b, c) = p(b, u) = Prob(θ < θb) ≡ p (15)
with p¯ > p since θa > θb.
This result is directly derived from the critical thresholds on the quality of the match.
For homogamous couples, the divorce law does not affect divorce probability. Indeed, the
two mates, sharing same preferences and facing the same match’s quality, agree on the
decision to separate or not. Moreover, since incentives to remain married are higher for b
individuals, the expected probability of divorce is larger for {a, a} couples than for {b, b}
ones (these probabilities are respectively p¯ and p). The divorce decision for heterogamous
couples may depend on the divorce law. In particular, when the quality of the match θ
belongs to the interval [θb, θa], the a type mate prefers to separate while the b type spouse
prefers to pursue the match. In that configuration, when the unilateral divorce applies,
the a type spouse has the voice and the couple divorces, hence the probability of divorce
is p¯ = Prob(θ < θa). Conversely, under the mutual consent divorce regime, the couple
cannot split without the consent of the b type spouse and the divorce probability becomes
p = Prob(θ < θb).
2. The theoretical literature on divorce decisions usually considers that a couple {i, j} divorces if a
randomly picked match quality θ is under a given critical value. This critical value is alternatively
modeled as max{θi, θj} (see, for instance, Weiss and Willis, 1985 or Chiappori and Weiss, 2007) or
(θi + θj)/2 (see, for instance, Chiappori et al., 2008). Here, we argue that the relevant formulation
crucially depends on the prevailing divorce law. Our interpretation applies if the Coase theorem does not
hold, i.e. if the utility is not transferable or if bargaining is costly (see Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006 for
a discussion).
9
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2.5 Expected utilities and political equilibrium
In the vote concerning divorce legislation, each individual opts for the alternative max-
imizing his/her expected utility for the period t + 1.3 This expected utility obviously
depends on the expected probability of divorce which is a function of divorce law and of
the couple composition.
We can derive the second adulthood period expected utility of an individual i, being
given the composition of his/her family f and the divorce law l. This expected utility is
denoted U i(f, l):
Ua(a, l) = p¯ud + (1− p¯)[um + E(θ|θ > θa)] (16)
U b(b, l) = p(ud − s) + (1− p)[um + E(θ|θ > θb)] (17)
U i(h, c) = pud(i) + (1− p)[um + E(θ|θ > θb)] ≡ U i (18)
U i(h, u) = p¯ud(i) + (1− p¯)[um + E(θ|θ > θa)] ≡ U¯ i (19)
with E(θ|θ > θi) the expected value of θ conditional to θ > θi. Note that, preferences of
the individual taking the final divorce decision not only determine the divorce probability
but also the expected utility of marriage. Indeed, b type individuals are more prone to
remain married for low quality of the match since they fear to support the social stigma
if they divorce. Then, the expected quality of the match when a b type individual is the
decision maker E(θ|θ > θb) is lower than the expected quality of the match when a a type
individual is the decision maker E(θ|θ > θa).
Finally, the match composition for an individual i depends on the matching prob-
abilities piijt , which in turn are function of qt the distribution of preferences within the
population. Hence, we obtain an expression of the second adulthood period expected
utility of an individual i, as a function of l and qt. This expected utility is denoted
W i(l, qt):
W a(l, qt) = pi
aa
t U
a(a, l) + (1− piaat )U
a(h, l) (20)
W b(l, qt) = pi
bb
t U
b(b, l) + (1− pibbt )U
b(h, l) (21)
Since individuals vote before to be matched they will choose the legislation maximizing
their expected utilities. Comparing those expected utilities, we can claim the following:
Lemma 1 W a(u, qt) ≥ W
a(c, qt) and W
b(u, qt) ≤ W
b(c, qt) for all qt ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. We have to determine the sign of W i(u, qt)−W
i(c, qt) for i ∈ {a, b}. Combining
(19)-(21), we obtain:
W i(u, qt)−W
i(c, qt) = (1− pi
ii
t )(U¯
i − U i)
sign
= U¯ i − U i
3.Note that, the expected utility of period t is independent of the divorce law. Indeed, all individuals
are married during the first adulthood period and their expected utility equals um +E(θ) = um whatever
the divorce law. Conversely, since divorce laws affect the probability to remain married during the second
adulthood period, vote decisions are based on expected utilities in t + 1.
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with
U¯ i − U i = (p¯− p)(ud(i)− um) + (1− p¯)E(θ|θ > θa)− (1− p)E(θ|θ > θb)
= (p¯− p)(ud(i)− um) +
∫ +∞
θa
θdF (θ)−
∫ +∞
θb
θdF (θ)
= (p¯− p)(ud(i)− um)−
∫ θa
θb
θdF (θ)
= (p¯− p)
{
ud(i)− um − E(θ|θ ∈ [θb, θa])
}
Using expressions (2)-(4), we conclude that U¯a − Ua ≥ 0 since
E(θ|θ ∈ [θb, θa]) ≤ θa = ud − um
and U¯ b − U b ≤ 0 since
E(θ|θ ∈ [θb, θa]) ≥ θb = ud − s− um
Hence, W a(u, qt) ≥ W
a(c, qt) and W
b(u, qt) ≤ W
b(c, qt).
Lemma 1 states that a type individuals always prefer the unilateral divorce law while
b type always prefer the mutual consent divorce law. The intuition behind this result is
quite simple. First of all, let us underline that ex-post, homogamous couples are indifferent
between the two legislations since the two mates agree on the decision to separate or not.
Concerning heterogamous couples, when the match quality is low (θ < θb) the two spouses
agree to split the match and the divorce law does not matter. In a similar way, if the match
quality is high (θ > θa) the two spouses mutually consent to remain married whatever
the legislation. Hence, Lemma 1 results from the situation of heterogamous couples with
an intermediate match’s quality (θ ∈ [θb, θa]). In such couples, the preferred solution of
a individuals (i.e. to separate) is implemented under the unilateral divorce law; while
the preferred solution of b individuals (i.e. to pursue the match) is chosen under the
mutual consent divorce regime. Consequently, a (respectively b) individuals maximize
their expected utility if unilateral divorce (respectively mutual consent divorce) is chosen.
We consider a majority voting rule, then we deduce the following result by assuming,
without loss of generality, that if the two legislations receive the same number of vote the
unilateral divorce is chosen:
Corollary 1 If qt < 1/2 the mutual consent divorce is chosen, otherwise the unilateral
divorce is chosen.
When qt < 1/2, b individuals are in majority, since they prefer the mutual consent divorce
law, this later obtain the higher number of votes and is implemented. Conversely, when a
individuals are in majority qt ≥ 1/2 the unilateral divorce law obtains a majority of votes
and is implemented.
2.6 Socialization
Our mechanisms of preferences transmission are borrowed from the well established model
proposed by Bisin and Verdier (2000 and 2001). Children are assumed to be born without
11
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.46
well-defined preferences. In a first step, they are socialized by their parents who try to
transmit their own traits. The probability of direct transmission is exogenously deter-
mined. Moreover, and differently from the existing literature, children are also influenced
by the divorce decision of their parents. Formally, if parental decisions in terms of divorce
correspond to the "family model", children adopt parental preferences with probability
one; if they do not correspond, children have a positive probability to adopt alternative
preferences (see Figure 3). For instance, if two parents of type b decide to stay married,
their children always adopt preferences b. Conversely, if they divorce, children become
a with a positive probability τ . This assumption captures the fact that, growing up in
a divorced family can instill offspring with less unfavorable attitudes towards divorce.
This mechanism is backed up by several sociological studies (see Wolfinger (1999, 2003);
Mclanahan and Bumpass, 1988). Moreover, as a support of our idea that both parental
attitudes and parental marital status matter for understanding children feeling about di-
vorce, Axinn and Thornton (1996) or Kapinus (2004) conclude that children of divorced
parents significantly adopt more favorable views toward divorce even after controlling for
intergenerational transmission of attitudes.
f = a
f = h
f = b
b
b
(1− p)
p
b
a
a
a
(1 − p¯)
p¯
p(h, l)
(1 − p(h, l))
b
b
a
d
d
1− d
1− d
τ
τ
1 − τ
1 − τ
a
Figure 3: Socialization process
The parameter τ ∈ (0, 1) measures the relative impact of parental decisions vs.
parental preferences on children socialization within homogamous families. In heterog-
amous families, there are no "family model", such that offspring are only influenced by
the marital status of their parents. Thus, we consider that a child adopts preferences
corresponding to parental divorce decisions with a probability d ∈ (1/2, 1).
We can define transition probability P f,i which determines the probability that a child
born in a type f family adopts preferences i conditioned by the marital state of parents
at the end of childhood:
P a,a = (1− p¯)(1− τ) + p¯ P a,b = (1− p¯)τ
P b,a = pτ P b,b = (1− p) + p(1− τ)
P h,a(p(h, l)) = (1− p(h, l))(1− d) + dp(h, l) P h,b(p(h, l)) = (1− p(h, l))d+ p(h, l)(1− d)
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3 Preferences, divorce rates and the legislation in the
long-run
Let us now analyze the preference dynamics of the model. To do so, we define as Qijt (l)
the probability that a child with a parent i will develop the trait j when the divorce law
l prevails:
Qaat (l) = pi
aa
t {(1− p¯)(1− τ) + p¯}+ (1− pi
aa
t ) {(1− p(h, l))(1− d) + dp(h, l)} (22)
Qbat (l) = pi
bb
t
{
pτ
}
+ (1− pibbt ) {(1− p(h, l))(1− d) + dp(h, l)} (23)
The law of motion of qt for a given l writes as:
qt+1 = qtQ
aa
t (l) + (1− qt)Q
ba
t (l) (24)
Substituting expressions (22) and (23) in (24) and using the results of Lemma 1, we obtain
an equation describing the complete dynamics of qt:
qt+1 =
{
f c(qt) if qt < 1/2
fu(qt) if qt ≥ 1/2
(25)
with
f c(qt) ≡ qtpi
aa
t [1− τ + τ p¯] + (1− qt)pi
bb
t τp+ 2(1− pi)qt(1− qt)[1− d+ (2d− 1)p] (26)
fu(qt) ≡ qtpi
aa
t [1− τ + τ p¯] + (1− qt)pi
bb
t τp+ 2(1− pi)qt(1− qt)[1− d+ (2d− 1)p¯] (27)
This dynamics exhibit the following properties:
Proposition 1 The dynamical system (25) admits either:
i one globally stable steady state qs = qˆ
c characterized by a consensual divorce law;
ii one globally stable steady state qs = qˆ
u characterized by a unilateral divorce law;
iii two locally stable steady states qs = qˆ
c and qs = qˆ
u respectively characterized by a
consensual and a unilateral divorce law.
Proposition 1 underlines the possible emergence of multiple equilibria. Mechanisms
behind this result are quite intuitive, if initially the proportion of type a individuals is low,
the median voter is a b one and the consensual divorce law is adopted. Accordingly, the
number of divorce remains limited and a preferences fail to expand: qt converges towards
qˆc. Conversely, if initially qt > 1/2, unilateral divorce law is chosen. It follows a large
divorce rate which triggers the spread of type a preferences: qt converges towards qˆ
u.
The following section illustrates the case ii of Proposition 1, in which qˆu is the unique
globally stable steady state, considering that q0 < 1/2.
Initially, b type individuals are in majority and the divorce law is consensual such that
the agreement of both spouses is necessary to divorce. Nevertheless, in that configuration
13
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qt+1
qt1
1
0 q0 1
2
qˆ
u
τp
τ p¯+ 1− τ
Figure 4: Convergence to the steady state
divorce rates tend to be relatively large, such that the proportion qt of type a workers
increases over time. This reduction in divorce stigmatization reinforces the rise of divorce
rates which triggers the evolution of qt and so on. As long as the proportion of type a
individuals becomes larger, the electoral weight of unilateral divorce law rises. Finally, qt
overtakes one half and the majority changes such that the divorce law becomes unilateral
and the economy converges towards qˆu.
Let us now asses the consequences of this dynamics in terms of the evolution of divorce
rates. Denote βlt the divorce rate under the legislation l, using the expressions of matching
probabilities (6)-(9) and divorce probabilities for each family type (14) and (15), we obtain:
βut = p¯− (1− qt)(p¯− p)[pi + (1− pi)(1− qt)] (28)
βct = p+ qt(p¯− p)[pi + (1− pi)qt] (29)
It is easy to verify that, first both βut and β
c
t are increasing functions in qt; and second
βut > β
c
t for all qt ∈ (0, 1). Here, changes in divorce rates are impulsed by changes in the
cultural composition of the population. The initial increases in qt implies the rise in divorce
rates before the change in divorce law. Thus the cultural dynamics generates a secular
increase in divorce rates even if the legislation remains consensual. In a second step, when
a type individuals are in majority within the society, the shift from consensual divorce to
unilateral divorce temporary accelerates the phenomena. Finally, divorce rates gradually
increase during the phase of convergence towards the steady state. Hence, according to
our analysis, a change in divorce law has an accelerating effect on the evolution of divorce
rate but is not the driving force behind the latter evolution.
Notice that, the dynamics of preferences is endogenous and may be affected by eco-
nomic and cultural factors. In particular, the tightening of the utility gap between being
14
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married or divorced implies an increase in the long-run proportion of agents who do not
mind about the norm, a type. Let us now develop a static comparative analysis of the
steady state qˆ.
3.1 Static comparative analysis
Most industrialized countries have known, in the course of the twentieth century, the
transition from a situation characterized by low divorce rates, relatively coercive divorce
law and a strong stigma against divorced persons, to a situation in which divorce is easier,
divorce rates higher and divorced less stigmatized (see Thornton and Young-DeMarco
(2001) for evidence on the long-run trends towards an increase in the acceptance of divorce
in the US). In the terms of our model, this transition may be regarded as the shift from the
equilibrium qˆc to the equilibrium qˆu. In this section, we analyze the factors able to explain
this transition. For this purpose, we consider an economy initially at the equilibrium qˆc
and we study the dynamical consequences of changes in the parameters.
3.1.1 The effect of the utility gap between being married and divorced
The following Proposition establishes that, for a sufficiently high increases in ud−um, the
equilibrium qˆc is destabilized and the economy converges towards qˆu.
Proposition 2 An increase in ud − um shifts both qˆc and qˆu towards the right, making
the configuration where qˆu is the unique globally stable steady state more likely.
A rise in ud− um induces an improvement in the relative situation of divorced people.
Consequently, it increases the thresholds level of match quality θa and θb and then divorce
probabilities whatever the divorce law or the composition of the couple (see expressions
(12)-(15)). At an aggregate level, it implies a rise in divorce rates that generates a spread
of type a preferences. As a consequence, the stationary level of qt becomes higher. If this
effect is large enough, qˆc overpasses one half, then qˆu becomes the unique steady state.
Several factors may be responsible for the progressive improvement in the relative
situation of divorced people. Greenwood and Guner (2009) suggest that technological
progress plays a key role. It leads to a decrease in the price of household electrical
appliances and thus a reduction in specialization within household. All these effects may
explain the drop in utility of being married by decreasing for example the gains in marriage
due to specialization within household.
Until now, we have assumed that there is no remarriage market. But if it is the
case, this will contribute to increase the utility of divorced persons. As the presence of
remarriage market gives the possibility for spouses after divorce to form a new union in
which the quality of match can be higher than in the first marriage. This may also reduce
the negative consequences of divorce such as impoverishment of one of the spouses or a
loss in well-being after divorce (De Graaf and Kalmijn, 2003). Notice that the higher is
the number of divorced persons the higher is the opportunity to meet someone and to
form a new union. So the recent increase in divorced persons supports the remarriage
market. This in turn will play positively on the utility of being divorced.
15
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3.1.2 The effect of the social stigma against divorce
As stated in the following Proposition, a decrease in the acceptance of divorce among
individuals of type b (measured by the parameter s) as the same consequences than an
improvement in the relative situation of divorced.
Proposition 3 A decrease in s shifts both qˆc and qˆu towards the right, making the con-
figuration where qˆu is the unique globally stable steady state more likely.
This result is in accordance with findings of Fella et al. (2004) which show that
changes in social norms may explain the increase in divorce rates. The impact of a
change in social norms on divorce rate is also highlighted in a recent paper by Chong and
La Ferrara (2009). On Brazilian data, the authors show that the share of divorced women
increases significantly after the Brazilian television network, Rede Globo, signal becomes
available. They interpret this impact as the effect of a change in cultural norms about
divorce allowed by the exposure to modern lifestyle as portrayed on TV. In our framework,
such a change may be approximated by a decrease in the parameter s implying a rise in
equilibrium divorce rates as argued in Proposition 3.
3.1.3 The effect of the homogamy parameter
Finally, we analyze the influence of a change in the parameter pi on the long-run equilib-
rium reached by the economy.
Proposition 4 An increase in pi shifts qˆc towards the right and qˆu towards the left.
According to this proposition, an increase in pi makes the two equilibria qˆc and qˆu closer.
Hence, it contributes to weaken the effect of a legislative change. Indeed, the impact of
divorce law on divorce rate fully passes through the probability of divorce of heterogamous
couples while a rise in pi reduces the proportion of this kind of match.
4 Empirical Analysis
In the model, the dynamics of preferences impulses both evolution of divorce rate and shift
in divorce laws. So a change in divorce law has an accelerating effect on the evolution of
divorce rate but is not the driving force behind the latter evolution. This result complies
with empirical research such as Sardon (1996), Allen (1998) or Coelho and Garoupa
(2006). More precisely, these authors suggest that reforms in divorce laws were likely to
constitute the response of the legislature to growing divorce rates rather than the cause.
In this section, we propose to test this hypothesis.
To do so, we use data at an aggregate level which are coming from Eurostat and OECD
database. The analysis has been done for 18 European countries in which changes in di-
vorce laws have occurred between 1970 and 2006: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
16
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First, we can observe the evolution of the average number of divorces per 1000 pop-
ulation in the 18 European countries between 1970 and 2006 represented in Figure 5a.
We observe an increasing trend in the evolution of divorce rate. Jointly to this increase
many changes in divorce laws have been occurred in these European countries. These
changes may concerned legalization of divorce, introduction of no-fault divorce or uni-
lateral divorce, and other reforms concerning divorce laws more or less important such
as the introduction of mediation between spouses or the reduction in breakdown time of
matrimonial life requested for divorce.
For instance, French divorce legislation has been characterized by two main reforms
during the studied period. During the seventies, the reform implemented by the Law of
July 11th 1975, has introduced "no-fault" divorce. More recently, in 2004 a new reform
has been occurred in order to make easier the divorce process (Law of May 26th 2004).
According to Figure 5b, it seems that the increase in divorce rates foregoes these both
changes in divorce legislation.4 So French evidence seem to be consistent with what we
want to test in this section.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
(a) Average number of divorces in studied countries
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
FRANCE
Number of divorces per 1 000 married couples
Number of divorces per 1 000 population
(b) Number of divorces in France
Figure 5. Evolution of number of divorces
Having observed statistically a relationship between evolution of divorce rate and
changes in divorce law for the French case, we test this relationship on the 18 European
countries through an econometric analysis. So the dependent variable is the change in
divorce law which corresponds to a dummy that is equal to one if there is a reform and 0
if not. The year of changes has been selected and not the year of appliance as we analyze
the choice of the legislator to reform divorce legislation.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1, Estimation (1) corresponding
4. French data are coming from the French national institute of statistics (INSEE).
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to a probit model with endogenous regressors using a maximum likelihood estimator.5
Estimation (2) corresponds to the regression of the divorce rate on the other variables
and represents the first stage of the Estimation (1). And Estimation (3) corresponds to
a two-step probit model with endogenous regressors using a Newey’s estimator. A list
of control variables are included: the divorce rate, the share of birth out of wedlock, the
share of women within total population and the marriage rate lagged 3 periods. All the
variables are statically significant and almost all enter in with the expected sign.
Table 1: Cross-country Regression Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES IVprobit ML Divorce rate IVprobit Two-step
Share of birth out of wedlock -0.0181** 0.0336*** -0.0202*
(0.00793) (0.00190) (0.0105)
Marriage rate lagged 3 periods 0.0631***
(0.0237)
Share of women 0.0792***
(0.00955)
Divorce rate 0.617** 0.688**
(0.249) (0.348)
Constant -2.102*** -7.631*** -2.376***
(0.222) (1.013) (0.449)
Observations 612 612 612
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
For the divorce rates we use the number of divorces per 1 000 inhabitants, as it is
difficult to obtain for a large range of countries the number of divorces per 1 000 married
couples, due to the lack of data concerning married people. We can see for the French
example illustrated by Figure 5b that both curves have the same trend of evolution but
differ in their magnitude of evolution. On the other hand, as many studied show that
changes in divorce laws have a positive long-run or only transitional effect on divorce
rate, we suspect that divorce rate will be an endogenous variable. This hypothesis is
confirmed by the Wald test of exogeneity on Estimation (1) whose the statistics is 6.10
and the p-value 0.0135. As the test statistic is significant, we can reject the null that is,
there is no endogeneity. This confirms that the divorce rate is endogenous and should be
instrumented.
To do so, we use two instruments; the share of women within total population and the
marriage rate lagged 3 periods. The share of women within society may be related to the
5.Notice that if we use a cluster option by year the estimations are better.
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sex ratio. The traditional literature studying divorce decisions shows that the sex ratio
influences divorce decisions by affecting, for instance, bargaining power of spouses within
household and also the composition of the marriage and remarriage market (Trent and
South, 1989). Conforming to this literature, the share of women within total population
has a positive effect on divorce. The second instrument corresponds to the number of
marriages per 1000 people lagged 3 periods. We use the marriage rate lagged 3 periods in
order to deal with the potential endogenous relationship between changes in divorce laws
and marriage rate. The marriage rate lagged 3 periods has a significant positive effect on
divorce rate.
These both variables seem to be good instruments as we can suspect that they can
only affect changes in divorce laws through divorce rate. Tests also confirm this expecta-
tion. The test of overidentifying restrictions whose Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-sq
statistic is 1.928 and the p-value 0.1649, signals that we can not reject the null hypothesis
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.6 The above test suggests we
can be satisfied with this specification.
We can now discuss and interpret effects of the other variables. The divorce rate
has a positive effect on the probability of changes in divorce laws. This corroborates
the hypothesis made in this section that the increase in divorce rate foregoes changes in
divorce laws. This also confirms the idea according to which the legislator, observing that
divorce becomes more and more common, chooses to introduce reform such as law will be
in accordance with what happened within society.
The share of birth out of wedlock may be analyzed as a proxy of the acceptance of
divorce within society, or the perception of marriage as an out-dated institution. Thus
the higher the share of birth out of wedlock, the lower the stigmatization of divorce
within society. The Estimation (2) shows that the share of birth out of wedlock has a
positive effect on the divorce rate. This is consistent with our results presented in our
theoretical model. The share of birth out of wedlock by increasing the divorce rate has
a positive indirect effect on changes in divorce laws, as an increase in divorce rate rises
the probability of divorce reform. However, the Estimation (1) shows that the share of
birth out of wedlock has a negative direct effect on the probability of divorce reform that
does not correspond to what we expect. An interpretation of this, maybe that marriage
becoming an out-dated institution reduces the incentive to legislate on as the number of
persons who wish to marry decreases.
To conclude, as in our theoretical model both divorce laws and divorce rates are
influenced by preferences dynamics and we have no direct instruments for a large range
of countries concerning preferences along time, we test in this section changes in divorce
laws controlling by divorce rate and born children out of wedlock.7 Results seem to show
6. This test is made on Estimation (3).
7.Data extracted from the World Value Survey may give an idea concerning preferences towards divorce
but informations are only given for one year with a frequency around 10 years on average.
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that dynamics in divorce rate affects changes in divorce laws. We also try to introduce
in a way social norms through the share of birth out of wedlock but results are mixed
concerning its effects on divorce reform. On the other hand, its effect on divorce rate
matches what we expect.
5 Conclusion
We develop a model of divorce, socialization and divorce laws which are endogenously
determined. In the population there exist two kinds of preferences distributed regardless
of gender. The evolution of divorce rate is impulsed by changes in the composition of the
population. More specifically, an increase in the proportion of individuals who disregard
the stigma from social norms will rise divorce rate. Our results show that a change in
divorce law temporary accelerates the evolution of divorce rate but is not the driving force
behind this dynamics. The dynamics of preferences is endogenous and may be affected by
economic factors. In particular, the tightening of the utility gap between being married
or divorced implies an increase in the long-run proportion of agents who do not mind
about the norm, a type. This tightening may come from an improvement in the price of
household appliances that reduces the specialization gains within household and thus the
gains from being married. On the other hand, changes in social stigma against divorce
may also affect the dynamics of preferences. In the last section, we analyze changes in
divorces laws controlling by divorce rate and birth out of wedlock.
The theoretical model could be extended in three ways. First, by introducing a remar-
riage market which presents new outside opportunities in case of divorce. Then, we can
introduce an endogenous effort of matching which in a way inserts decision of marriage.
Agents in their decisions of search effort will take into account the socialization process
of children which depends on type of marriage; homogamous or heterogamous in which
they will be. Finally, we could introduce choice concerning domestic production. This
new family choice should affect divorce decision as empirical studies prescribe (Greenwood
and Guner, 2009; Stevenson, 2007).
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Appendices
A Divorce legislation
Table 2: Divorce laws by country, 1970-2006
Country Divorce laws
Austria 1978 1999
Denmark 1989 1991 1999
Finland 1987
France 1975 2004
Germany 1976
Greece 1979 1983
Hungary 1974 1986 1995
Iceland 1993
Ireland 1996
Italy 1970 1975 1987
Luxembourg 1975 1978
Netherlands 1971
Norway 1991
Portugal 1975 1977 1995 1998 2001
Spain 1981 2005
Sweden 1973 1987
Switzerland 1998
United Kingdom 1973 1984 1996
Sources: National reports of the Commission on European family law (2002),
Commaille et al. (1983) and national legislation.
Remarks: For the United Kingdom, only divorce laws for England and Wales have been taken into account.
B Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is divided in four steps: (i) we prove the existence and the uniqueness of the
equilibrium qs = qˆ
c for qt ∈ [0, 1/2];(ii) we prove the existence and the uniqueness of the
equilibrium qs = qˆ
u for qt ∈ [1/2, 1]; (iii) we prove the stability of steady states of qˆ
c and
qˆu; and (iiii) we deduce steady states of the complete dynamics of qt given by the system
(25).
(i) Existence and uniqueness of the steady state qˆc for qt ∈ [0, 1/2]. It comes from
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equation (26) that qˆc is solution of the equation:
qt − (1− qt)pτ(pi + (1− pi)(1− qt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHSc(qt)
= qt(pi + (1− pi)qt)((1− p¯)(1− τ) + p¯) + 2(1− pi)(1− qt)qt((1− p)(1− d) + pd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHSc(qt)
(B.1)
LHSc(qt) and RHSc(qt) are increasing in qt. Moreover, LHSc(0) = −pτ and RHSc(0) =
0, LHSc(1
2
) = 1
2
(1 − 1
2
pτ(1 + pi)) > 0 and RHSc(1
2
) = 1
4
(1 + pi)((1 − p¯)(1 − τ) + p¯) +
1
2
(1 − pi)((1 − p)(1 − d) + pd). Consequently, LHSc(qt) and RHSc(qt) cross only once
for qt ∈ [0, 1/2] if LHSc(
1
2
) > RHSc(1
2
) such that τ >
(1−pi)[2((1−p)(1−d)+pd)−1]
(1+pi)(1−p¯−p)
≡ τ˜ , the
existence and uniqueness of qˆc directly follows for qt ∈ [0, 1/2].
(ii) Existence and uniqueness of the interior steady state qˆu for qt ∈ [1/2, 1]. It comes
from equation (27) that qˆu is solution of the equation:
qt − (1− qt)pτ(pi + (1− pi)(1− qt))− 2(1− pi)(1− qt)qt((1− p¯)(1− d) + p¯d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHSu(qt)
= qt(pi + (1− pi)qt)((1− p¯)(1− τ) + p¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHSu(qt)
(B.2)
LHSu(qt) and RHSu(qt) are increasing in qt. Moreover, LHSu(1/2) =
1
2
(1− 1
2
(1+pi)pτ−
(1−pi)((1− p¯)(1−d)+ p¯d)), RHSu(1/2) = 1
4
(1+pi)((1− p¯)(1−τ)+ p¯), LHSu(1) = 1 and
RHSu(1) = ((1− p¯)(1− τ) + p¯) < 1. Consequently, LHSu(qt) and RHSu(qt) cross only
once for qt ∈ [1/2, 1] if RHSu(1/2) > LHSu(1/2) such that τˆ ≡
(1−pi)[2((1−p¯)(1−d)+p¯d)−1]
(1+pi)(1−p¯−p)
>τ ,
the existence and uniqueness of qˆu directly follows for qt ∈ [1/2, 1].
(iii) Stability of steady states in each case. First, when τ > τ˜ , for qt ∈ [0, 1/2],
∆qt = qt+1 − qt = RHSc(qt) − LHSc(qt). If RHSc(qt) > LHSc(qt) (resp. RHSc(qt) <
LHSc(qt)), ∆qt > 0 (resp. < 0) and qt increases (resp. decreases). This implies that for
qt ∈ [0, 1/2] the unique steady state qˆ
c of the dynamics qt+1 = f
c(qt) is globally stable.
Second, when τ < τˆ , for qt ∈ [1/2, 1], ∆qt = qt+1 − qt = RHSu(qt) − LHSu(qt). If
RHSu(qt) > LHSu(qt) (resp. RHSc(qt) < LHSc(qt)), ∆qt > 0 (resp. < 0) and qt
rises (resp. drops). This implies that for qt ∈ [1/2, 1] the unique steady state qˆ
u of the
dynamics qt+1 = f
u(qt) is globally stable.
(iiii) Steady states of the complete dynamics of qt given by the system (25). From (i),
(ii) and (iii), we can deduce that first for τ > τˆ , the system (25) admits one globally
stable steady state qˆc ∈ [0, 1/2]. Second, for τ˜ > τ , the system (25) admits one globally
stable steady state qˆu ∈ [1/2, 1]. Finally, for τˆ > τ > τ˜ the system (25) has two locally
stable steady states qˆc and qˆu.
C Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
We know that ud − um ≡ θa, ud − um − s ≡ θb and, p and p¯ are defined such that
Prob(θ < θa) ≡ p¯ and Prob(θ < θb) ≡ p. An increase in ud − um implies a both rise in θa
and θb that in turn increases p and p¯, while a drop in s implies a rise in θb that in turn
increases p. It comes from Equations (26) and (27) that ∂f
c(qt)
∂p
> 0, ∂f
u(qt)
∂p
> 0, ∂f
c(qt)
∂p¯
> 0
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and ∂f
u(qt)
∂p¯
> 0. Thus an increase in ud − um and a drop in s pushes to the right f c(qt)
and fu(qt), rising by this way both qˆ
c and qˆu.
D Proof of Proposition 4
According to Equations (26) and (27) we have,
∆f l(qt) = f
c(qt)− f
u(qt) = 2(1− pi)(2d− 1)(p− p¯) (D.1)
and
lim
pi→1
f c(qt) = lim
pi→1
fu(qt)⇒ qˆ
c = qˆu = qˆ (D.2)
Equations (D.1) and (D.2) show that an increase in pi moves the two dynamics closer,
reducing by this way the effect of legislation on the dynamics of preferences.
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